Conceptions of ‘Bad’ Civil Society: Normative and Empirical Dimensions

The recent, contested curtailment of civil-society protests by governments across Europe highlights two interrelated concerns shared by researchers and practitioners alike: the intensification of societal radicalization and polarization, with far-reaching implications for democratic processes; and the erosion of civic rights across liberal democracies, a development closely linked to broader debates on democratic decay. In this context, these actors face the challenges of drawing the line – both normatively and empirically – between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ parts of civil society, and determining under what conditions the rights of the latter can be justifiably curtailed, despite both groups jointly constituting an increasingly diverse, organizational infrastructure through which citizens’ collective interests are mobilized and articulated. Researchers in particular tend to use—often implicitly—different notions of ‘bad civil society’ in relation to specific problems or challenges to the liberal-democratic order (e.g. the rise of right-wing extremist violence, religious fundamentalism, or radicalization of public discourse). These varied conceptualizations broaden the grounds based on which CSOs might be considered harmful and, consequently, in need of containment (be this through ‘good’ CSOs, the political mainstream or the authorities). This development, in turn, revives old questions about whether and to what extent the realm of organized life that – though not pro-democratic or liberal – should be tolerated. Taking an overarching perspective, we systematize the literature on bad, dark, illiberal, undemocratic or uncivil CSOs and specify on what basis CSOs – on the organization level – are defined as harmful or hostile to the liberal-democratic order. On this basis, we distinguish different types of bad civil society defined by qualitatively distinct forms of ‘harmfulness’, finding expression in organizations’ values, goals or actions. Distinguishing between harm to individuals, society or the political system level, harms can affect group members (those belonging to ‘bad’ CSOs themselves or members of groups targeted by them), inter-group relations or the functioning of the democratic process or the state. Using our typology of bad CSO types as theoretical foundation, we, in turn, engage in an empirical and normative assessment. First, building on comparative law, we discuss whether and how this scholarly development manifests itself in the ways liberal democracies can legally curtail an ever-wider range of societal actors to counter harm to the liberal democratic order , drawing on cross-national evidence of growing restrictions on freedom of expression in European countries over the past two decades. Second, drawing on normative political theory, we discuss the potential implications of an increasingly inclusive, but often blurred, understanding of ‘bad’ CSOs and ‘bad’ activities they engage in – as manifest in the regulation of freedom of expression and other rights domains – for the liberal-democratic state .