Crisis as Catalyst or Constraint? Promise, Progress, and Prospects of REPowerEU in Turbulent Times

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 created the most severe energy security crisis in the EU’s history, prompting hopes that the shock would accelerate the low-carbon transition and fears that it would instead derail climate policies and entrench fossil-fuel dependence. This paper examines how this crisis reshaped EU climate and energy governance through an in-depth analysis of REPowerEU — the Union’s central policy response. Existing scholarship is divided on whether crises facilitate or hinder decarbonisation. Some argue that energy insecurity strengthens political will for non-fossil sources and legitimises ambitious reforms. Others suggest that crises divert political attention, channel resources toward familiar and sometimes cheaper fossil solutions, and risk reinforcing carbon lock-in. The 2022 crisis provides a rare case for adjudicating between these perspectives. Drawing on policy documents, energy statistics, scenario analyses, and the historical development of EU energy and climate frameworks, this paper evaluates the formulation, ambition, implementation, interim outcomes and prospects of REPowerEU. The analysis shows that the 2022 crisis produced a significant reframing of renewable energy within EU policymaking. REPowerEU securitised renewables in a manner unprecedented in EU energy governance, positioning them as instruments of energy sovereignty and strategic autonomy rather than solely as climate solutions. This securitising move raised expectations that the crisis would trigger a transformative acceleration of the low-carbon transition. Yet, despite this strong rhetoric, REPowerEU only moderately adjusted rather than fundamentally revised the EU’s climate and energy commitments. It marginally increased renewable energy targets while leaving emissions goals unchanged and did not reverse the decline in subsidy support for renewables. Higher energy prices boosted the profitability of renewable power and motivated speedier implementation measures in some Member States, but these effects were uneven across technologies and countries. At the same time, Member States expanded fossil-fuel subsidies to shield households and industries from soaring energy costs. Nevertheless, fossil-fuel consumption shifted only slightly: coal continued its structural decline, oil remained stable, and natural gas ceased growing – suggesting that crisis responses did not lead to large-scale fossil-fuel resurgence. Overall, REPowerEU *sustained* rather than *transformed* the EU’s low-carbon trajectory, illustrating both the potential and limits of accelerating decarbonisation efforts under conditions of geopolitical turbulence. The paper identifies mechanisms through which crises can strengthen or weaken climate governance: increased political motivation to reduce fossil dependence, securitisation that enhances legitimacy of climate policy, and higher renewable profitability on the one hand; resource diversion, renewed fossil subsidies, and cautious incrementalism on the other. By analysing REPowerEU as the first major test of the European Green Deal in an era of democratic and geopolitical turbulence, the paper contributes to understanding how crises reshape EU climate governance, the conditions under which transformative ambition is constrained, and the prospects for delivering climate neutrality while maintaining democratic legitimacy.