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Why Should I Respect You?: A Critique and a Kantian Suggestion for the Justification for Freedom of Speech in Contractualism

Baldwin Wong
The London School of Economics & Political Science
Baldwin Wong
The London School of Economics & Political Science

Abstract

Contractualism is a normative theory which has a Kantian root and justifies freedom of speech by the idea of mutual respect. According to this theory, mutual respect is defined as where one individual is in a relationship of mutual recognition with one another. In other words, individuals respect one another by acting in a way in which could be justified to one another. This includes respecting the freedom of speech of one another. Contemporary contractualists, such as Scanlon and Rawls, believe that freedom of speech have an unconditional, absolute priority because mutual respect is so important that it should be given priority over other values. The aim of this essay is to examine how contractualists can justify the priority of freedom of speech. In the first part, I will explain the contractualist idea of mutual respect and the appealing argument, which is the justification provided by most of the contractualists. The appealing argument justifies the priority of freedom of speech by emphasizing the great desirability of the relationship of mutual recognition. In the second part, I will present a critique of the appealing argument, argue that it is hard to see how, from the fact that the relationship of mutual recognition is desirable, it can possibly follow that this relationship ought to have the priority over other conflicting values, for other conflicting values may be desirable as well. In the third part, I will suggest that the ‘consistency argument’ can provide a more satisfactory justification for the unconditional priority of freedom of speech. Respecting freedom of speech is of special importance, not because the relationship of mutual recognition is a highly desirable one, but rather because this relationship is based on the requirement to behave consistently. Individuals become inconsistent if they ask others to respect them as reason-assessing individuals, while at the same time refusing to respect others in the same way. At the end of this paper, I point out that, although the appealing argument is widely adopted by contemporary contractualists, it is actually a Millian approach of justification and can at most justify conditional priority of mutual respect. Therefore, contractualists should adopt the consistency argument instead, which is a Kantian approach of justification, so that they can be more coherent and can justify unconditional priority of mutual respect by an a priori guiding principle of consistency.