Contractualism is a normative theory which justifies principles of justice by the idea of mutual respect. According to this theory, mutual respect is defined as where one individual is in a relationship of mutual recognition with one another. In other words, individuals respect one another by acting in a way in which could be justified to one another. Contemporary contractualists, such as Scanlon and Rawls, believe that principles of justice have an unconditional, absolute priority because mutual respect is so important that it should be given priority over other values. This includes tolerating and respecting some basic rights of each individual. The aim of this essay is to examine how contractualists can justify the priority of mutual respect. In the first part, I will explain the contractualist idea of mutual respect and the appealing argument, which is the justification provided by most of the contractualists. The appealing argument justifies the priority of mutual respect by emphasizing the great desirability of the relationship of mutual recognition. In the second part, I will present a critique of the appealing argument, argue that it is hard to see how, from the fact that the relationship of mutual recognition is desirable, it can possibly follow that this relationship ought to have the priority over other conflicting values, for other conflicting values may be desirable as well. Some people may refuse to tolerate others because, to them, other values are more desirable than the relationship of mutual recognition. In the third part, I will suggest that the ‘consistency argument’ can provide a more satisfactory justification for the unconditional priority of mutual respect. Mutual respect is of special importance, not because the relationship of mutual recognition is a highly desirable one, but rather because it is based on the requirement to behave consistently. Individuals become inconsistent if they ask others to respect them as reason-assessing individuals, while at the same time refusing to respect others in the same way. At the end of this paper, I point out that, although the appealing argument is widely adopted by contemporary contractualists, it is actually a Millian approach of justification and can at most justify conditional priority of mutual respect. Therefore, contractualists should adopt the consistency argument instead, which is a Kantian approach of justification, so that they can justify unconditional priority of mutual respect by an a priori logical principle of consistency.
