The Cost of Unanimity

The unanimity requirement within the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), established by Article 31(1) TEU, is said to profoundly impact the Union's ability to act on the global stage. The reasons for this, however, are often simply assumed. This article, instead, wants to articulate them and ground them empirically. To that aim, the analysis first develops a typology of unanimity’s practical application, examining empirical cases of the ‘direct veto’, the use of Constructive Abstention to bypass deadlock, and instances of Veto Avoidance by Compromise or ‘hostage-taking’, where Member States extort concessions on unrelated issues or force the dilution of the measure itself. This paper then conceptualises three kinds of costs: the Efficiency Cost (operational delay and paralysis), the Effectiveness Cost (policy dilution and lowest-common-denominator compromises), and the Credibility Cost (damage to the EU’s international reputation). The paper then explores the path forward in the absence of politically infeasible Treaty revision. It scrutinizes underutilized procedural mechanisms within the existing framework (such as the CFSP passerelle clause) and engages with an emerging legal doctrine. This doctrine posits that the veto is not an unbridled right, arguing that its abusive exercise, particularly when it contravenes the duty of sincere cooperation or fundamentally jeopardizes the Union’s core security and teleological objectives, may constitute a breach of EU law, thus offering a potential limit on the ‘cost of unanimity’. It concludes with a reflection on how qualified majority voting also entails costs – relating to efficiency and credibility – which are inherent in political decision-making.