Disentangling the value of the judicial office: Evidence from Ecuador

This paper provides the first systematic estimate of the economic returns to serving on an apex court in a newer democracy. Using data from Ecuador’s Constitutional Court (2001–2023) across five cohorts, I exploit the quasi-random appointment of shortlisted nominees to identify causal effects on post-tenure income. Drawing on a novel dataset combining rich biographical profiles with individual income tax records, and employing a staggered difference-in-differences design, I find that appointment increases annual income by an average of 61.2%, equivalent to USD 21,561.67, over a six-year period. Gains are consistently positive across different court compositions, ranging from USD 44,981.73 to USD 10,075.89. These results demonstrate that apex court service substantially enhances human and social capital, translating into lucrative post-office opportunities in private practice, academia, government, and international institutions. The findings have important implications for judicial selection design, incentive structures, and the political economy of courts in newer democracies.