How analogue legacies shape the use of digital tools in autocracies

Information and Communication Technologies and advanced AI applications have transformed authoritarian politics and mechanisms of control. Yet, we observe that not all autocrats use digital tools to the same extent and in similar ways. For example, the extent to which authoritarian regimes rely on CCTV coverage, surveillance software, e-governance applications, or governmental control of network hardware differs; whereas some regimes cut internet connections or rely on bots to influence narratives, for others such methods are a rather peripheral matter. Until now, we lack explanations of how and why authoritarian regimes show different patterns in using digital tools to limit and eliminate threats to their rule (Schlumberger et al. 2024). Some works propose that high state capacity and access to technologies determine the extent autocrats use the methods of digital authoritarianism (Feldstein 2021). This might imply that other countries would follow a similar path with some delay. Other works suggest that patterns of elite competition influence how regimes employ certain techniques of digitally-assisted control (Ruijgrok et al. 2025). We argue that in order to understand variations of digital authoritarianism, we need to consider previous (analogue) structures and power relations in authoritarian regimes. We thus integrate established knowledge about authoritarian rule – e.g. structure of elite competition, as well as legitimation and cooptation strategies – to understand variations in how authoritarian regimes deploy digital tools of authoritarian control. In order to explore the causes of diverging digital patterns further, we analyze the cases of Singapore, Kenya, and Ecuador. These cases vary along three important dimensions: First, how advanced is the country in using ICTs for government tasks and in integrating AI to control its citizens (subjects). Second, authoritarian regimes differ in their power structures, types of relevant political elites and patterns of elite competition. Third, the cases are located in different world regions and vary in the origin of digital technologies. It is obvious that with such large variation, we cannot strictly control factors, but this is a conscious decision acknowledging the current state of the literature. Given that research on the topic is still in its infancy, it is warranted and even necessary that we explore several potential causal mechanisms with process tracing methods to advance in theory-building, rather than starting from simplified assumptions. We aim to investigate the importance, for example, of previous elite structures or the international purchase of software on how autocracies integrate digital tools into their broader ruling strategies. On that basis, we develop concrete hypotheses that can then be tested and adjusted in further, larger studies. Feldstein, S. (2021). The rise of digital repression: How technology is reshaping power, politics, and resistance. Oxford UP. Ruijgrok, K., Berenschot, W., Gaw, F., Sombatpoonsiri, J., Wijayanto, Agonos, M. J., & Sastramidjaja, Y. (2025). Towards the Comparative Study of Domestic Influence Operations: Cyber Troops and Elite Competition in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Political Communication, 1–21. Schlumberger, O., Edel, M., Maati, A., & Saglam, K. (2024). How authoritarianism transforms: A framework for the study of digital dictatorship. G&O, 59(3), 761-783.