Do Populist Attitudes Predict Euroscepticism? Evidence from 31 Countries

The relationship between populism and Euroscepticism on the supply side (among political parties) has been extensively documented in political science, while the demand side (among citizens) remains less explored. Understanding the latter offers important insights into the broader dynamics of the politicization of European integration, public support for the EU, and the attitudinal foundations of contemporary party competition. Although a common expectation suggests that populist orientations should reinforce Eurosceptic attitudes due to their anti-elitist character, research on populist parties reveals substantial variation in the framing and intensity of Eurosceptic appeals (e.g., Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008; Heinisch et al. 2020). Similar heterogeneity can be expected among citizens. This study examines whether populist attitudes among citizens strengthen Eurosceptic orientations and how this relationship varies across the ideological spectrum. It also explores whether left-leaning and right-leaning populist attitudes operate in similar ways or are conditioned by ideological context. In addition, the analysis considers a range of attitudinal and socio-demographic factors commonly associated with Euroscepticism to assess how robust the relationship appears in contemporary Europe. The study utilizes data from the tenth round of the European Social Survey (ESS 10, 2020; ESS ERIC 2025), which offers exceptional geographical coverage across 31 countries, including EU members, non-members, and candidate states. This coverage makes it possible to compare demand-side patterns across a wide range of political contexts. ESS10 includes an item tapping people-centrism, which we employ as a proxy for populist attitudes, while acknowledging its limitations relative to full-scale populism batteries (e.g., Akkerman et al. 2014; Castanho Silva et al. 2020). The measure of Euroscepticism positions individuals on a continuum between supporting further European integration and believing it has gone too far, offering an indicative representation of the broader construct. Methodologically, the analysis relies on regression models estimated on the full pooled dataset with country fixed effects to account for unobserved national characteristics. Interaction terms are included to test whether the relationship between populist attitudes and Euroscepticism varies by ideological orientation, and separate country-level regressions are estimated to examine how this relationship manifests across different national contexts. The aim of the study is to offer a large-scale comparative assessment of the populism–Euroscepticism relationship at the citizen level. The analysis explores whether this relationship emerges consistently across Europe or whether it appears to be shaped by ideological or contextual factors.