Between Solidarity and Strategy: The Evolution of EU Development Aid

Solidarity has become a prominent theme in European Union (EU) foreign policy rhetoric amid wars and crises, yet how this principle is translated into practice remains under-explored. This paper examines how the EU practices “international solidarity” through its development aid, and how that practice evolves in times of conflict and shifting geopolitical power. While EU leaders often frame Official Development Assistance (ODA) as an altruistic commitment to global development, research shows that aid allocation frequently serves EU strategic interests. Our study investigates whether the EU’s aid allocations align more with solidarity (prioritizing the neediest and upholding normative values) or with realpolitik calculations, and how this balance changes under different international contexts. We analyze the evolution of EU ODA from 1980 to 2022, a period spanning the Cold War through the post-Cold War and into today’s multipolar environment. Using historical evidence and quantitative data, we track shifts in aid drivers over time. We categorize motivations into three types: recipient need (humanitarian relief and poverty reduction, reflecting a solidarity ethos), donor interest (geopolitical and economic self-interest), and selectivity (promotion of governance and economic reforms abroad). An interaction-based statistical model tests how the influence of these factors varies with the EU’s relative global economic strength. This approach assesses when a solidarity-driven logic prevails and when a self-interested approach dominates EU aid policy. The findings reveal a dynamic pattern. When the EU enjoys a position of relative economic strength and stability, its aid allocations correspond more closely to international solidarity principles. In such periods – for example, the 1990s – the EU tends to direct more ODA to the poorest countries and rewards improvements in human rights and governance, projecting itself as a normative power. Conversely, when the EU’s influence wanes or it faces internal crises, aid shifts toward strategic considerations. Under such strain, the EU prioritizes countries of high strategic importance to itself (such as neighbors or key partners), even if those are not the neediest. This shift is exemplified by the EU’s aid packages to Turkey during the 2015 refugee crisis and to Ukraine after 2022, which were touted as acts of solidarity yet clearly advanced EU interests in migration management and regional security. Similarly, aid has been used as an incentive in deals with North African states, blurring the line between solidarity and pragmatism. Our study contributes to the underdeveloped theorization of international solidarity in EU foreign policy. The evidence indicates that the EU’s commitment to solidarity with external partners is highly conditional rather than absolute. Solidarity in EU external action expands when the Union is strong and can afford a more altruistic stance, but contracts under pressure, giving way to realpolitik. These insights deepen our understanding of how “international solidarity” is constructed and practiced by the EU in an era of war and geopolitical competition, and underscore the need to critically examine the gap between solidarity discourse and policy practice.