Geopolitics and the Australia–EU FTA

Since 2018, the European Union (EU) has been negotiating an Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Australia. Stalled in 2023 over Australia’s upset at its market access offer for its beef, sheep meat, dairy, and sugar exports to the EU, in November 2025 talks have been reinvigorated. EU Trade Commissioner Sefcovic predicted that “the final stages of negotiations would occur by early next year”. Although reported that discussions were renewed by Australia as a reaction to US President Donald Trump tariffs on Australian products, the last decade has seen the EU mention securing an FTA with Australia in a number of documents including the 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. For Australia, agricultural access remains a key area of concern in any final deal. For instance, the National Farmers’ Federation President , Hamish McIntyre “urged the minister not to short-change agriculture in a “rush to sign a deal”’ and opposition trade spokesman Kevin Hogan warned the “government must not sell out our farmers”. In a recent speech, EU Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen commented on the possibility of securing the EU-Australia FTA by emphasising the like-mindedness of the negotiating parties: “We both know that the last mile is always the hardest, but I am absolutely confident and it is worth it. Because we are very like-minded and there are a lot of good opportunities.” Using qualitative textual analysis of speeches, preparatory documents justifying the agreement as well as interviews with EU officials to unpack the EU’s symbolic rationale for pursuing the deal over seven years and to interrogate its potential effect beyond symbolic performance. This paper provides a robust analysis of EU geopolitical motivations for prioritising an FTA with Australia. Although economic advantages are higher than with the Aotearoa New Zealand FTA, nevertheless it appears that geopolitical considerations remain a key driver for the EU. Ultimately, we find an increasing trend in how trade agreements can serve as instruments of geopolitical symbolism, not just economic exchange. We find that the deal would serve to extend EU ties with Pacific states, and to weave closer economic relations with CPTPP states, most of which already have free trade agreements with the EU. CPTPP has emerged and presents itself as a bastion of a rules-based order, in reaction to China’s rise, Russia’s aggression, and US retreat from international norms and rules-based organisations. This ambition links the EU to CPTPP states, despite disagreements on specific trade and economic rules and regulations. Like with Aotearoa New Zealand, an agreement with Australia serves as an important symbolic statement in support of a liberal rules-based economic order; demonstrates an intention to forge economic alliances with ‘like-minded’ partners wherever they might be.