EU democracy promotion in times of external competition and internal dissensus: The case of Armenia

While Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine changed the EU’s thinking about its Eastern neighbourhood, Russia’s role in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has transformed Armenia’s thinking about the EU. The 2018 Velvet revolution had already laid the groundwork for closer relations with Europe through its rejection of autocracy, its embrace of liberalism and its ouster of a political class with close links to the Russian political establishment. Following Armenia’s 2020 war with Azerbaijan and the exodus of Karabakh Armenians in late 2023, public opinion and the government’s position on Russia changed dramatically due to the perception that the erstwhile ally had let them down. In parallel, the profound shock of having lost Nagorno Karabakh and an influx of displaced Karabakh Armenians led to unprecedented polarisation within Armenian society. Faced with major contestation, prime minister Nikol Pashinyan – the leader of the 2018 Velvet revolution – began to exhibit authoritarian tendencies himself. Meanwhile, the EU’s efforts to support Armenia’s democratic transition and its reorientation towards Euro-Atlantic institutions are delayed by internal dissensus, with individual member states slowing down support packages aimed at supporting Armenian security and reducing its dependence on Russia or measures such as the visa liberalisation dialogue. Exploring these dynamics, this paper seeks to provide a better understanding of how the EU’s approach to democracy promotion is shaped by both its global competition with the autocratic international, including the compromises between strategic interests and democratic principles that this competition involves, as well as the EU’s internal dissensus over the liberal democratic script.