Temporary Sovereignty and the Crisis-Born Power of DG ECFIN
Elites
European Union
Governance
Institutions
Qualitative
Policy-Making
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Abstract
This paper examines how the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) has acquired and exercised forms of “temporary sovereignty” during successive crises, and what this implies for institutional power and democratic accountability in the European Union. Contrary to linear or cumulative accounts of institutional empowerment, the paper argues that transformations in EU economic governance are episodic and reversible: competences expand in moments of crisis, only to partially retract once emergency conditions subside.
Drawing on original fieldwork within the European Commission and elite interviews, the paper demonstrates how DG ECFIN emerges as a de facto federal ministry during crises, assuming sovereign-like functions in debt issuance, fiscal coordination, macroeconomic surveillance, and financial management. In periods of protracted crisis, however, temporariness becomes durable. Repeated emergencies, from the eurozone crisis to the pandemic and energy shock, have allowed DG ECFIN to accumulate managerial expertise, operational capacity, and hands-on knowledge of member-state administrations. This experiential capital positions the Directorate in a structurally privileged role within the Commission ecosystem, even as formal competences remain bounded by the treaties. The paper highlights two implications of this crisis-driven empowerment. First, it raises fundamental questions of democratic accountability: unelected technocratic actors exercise far-reaching authority over national budgets, reforms, and investment priorities without corresponding reinforcement of political oversight. Second, it points to a process of institutional mission creep, whereby crisis instruments and practices are gradually normalised and redeployed beyond their original mandate. As a result, the Commission expands its reach and intrusiveness through executive action rather than formal constitutional change. The paper concludes that Europe’s reliance on temporary sovereignty produces a structurally imbalanced polity, one in which executive power grows through crises, while democratic foundations lag behind.