This paper discusses the normative implications of the problem of the ‘discursive dilemma’ in social choice theory for designing institutions for direct democracy which comprises deliberation and aggregation. In the past two decades, the emphasis of deliberative democracy has been on spelling out the ideal properties of a deliberative process, while the matter of collective choice and decision rule, an essential aspect of democracy, has been generally ignored. Meanwhile, the latter issue is particularly important when: (1) deliberative democracy is operationalised as part of the process of direct democracy; and (2) deliberation alone cannot generate substantive consensus for decision-making. In response to such a feasibility constraint, John Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer (2006/2007) propose two deliberative outcomes which we should aim at, i.e., meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality. They argue that both normative ends are not only consistent with ideal deliberative procedures but also generate stable collective decisions. In this paper, I examine the two normative ends of deliberation under the context of a ‘deliberation-then-aggregation’ (DTA) institution of direct democracy, such as citizens'' initiative and referendum. Drawing on the discursive dilemma from social choice theory, I argue that meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality may result in unstable democratic outcomes. This is due to the fact that they are logically inconsistent with democratic equality, an appealing condition of an aggregation procedure. I suggest that this problem can be avoided if we reconsider the normative ends of deliberation. Taking this theoretical issue seriously can avert the possible loopholes in institutionalising direct democracy in practice.
