Strategic Demobilisation as Democratic Defence

It is commonly thought that democracies thrive when citizens actively participate in politics. However, when citizens’ political participation involves supporting political actors who undermine democracy, this widely held belief becomes questionable. This paper therefore argues that the demobilisation of voters with non-democratic inclinations can be an effective means of democratic defence. The paper distinguishes voter suppression from voter demobilisation, contending that the former is normatively much more problematic than the latter and is only permissible in electoral autocracies where democratic forces are severely threatened by non-democratic ones. Demobilising voters, on the other hand, can be a legitimate part of pro-democratic campaign strategies. The paper further argues that pro-democratic political actors may also wish to employ demobilisation strategies for pragmatic reasons: as they lack the ideological resources to appeal to disenchanted voters with populist or authoritarian leanings, ensuring that these voters stay at home on election day could be their best chance of holding onto power and maintaining the integrity of democratic institutions.