Messy Democratization of Science

Intended panel: Panel 2: Epistemic Integrity and the Problem of Misinformationxt In response to problems such as misinformation and the intentional undermining of expert authority, researchers in philosophy of science and Science and Technology Studies have tried to diagnose what has gone wrong by reference to various ideal standards for an epistemically well-functioning democratic society (e.g., what Heather Douglas calls a “social contract for science”). Typically, the epistemically well-functioning society is imagined to be one in which experts, scientific or otherwise, “stay in their lane,” but in which non-experts follow suit. The result is a social-epistemic “division of labour,” which is meant to (a) limit expert authority to an advising capacity, thus avoiding technocracy, but at the same time (b) require non-expert deference to relevant experts’ advice. On this view, science and other sources of expertise should not override public will, but public will should nevertheless be constrained by the best available evidence. When this give and take fails (i.e., when the proper division of labour breaks down), social-epistemic problems arise, as in, for example, Nathan Ballantyne’s concept of “epistemic trespassing.” The solution that follows is to bring society in alignment with the social-epistemic ideal, whatever exactly it is. Yet this relatively top-down approach has the disadvantage of neglecting the messy, non-ideal processes by which expert authority becomes integrated into democracy. After all, such processes, which include strategic epistemic trespassing, resisting scientific research, etc., frequently fall far short of the ideal. However, by falling short of the ideal and raising the stakes, the very same processes can highlight neglected voices, push forward previously dismissed demands, etc., thereby advancing democratic goals. I illustrate this point by examining Steven Epstein’s classic study of 1980s AIDS treatment activism through the lens of democratic theory, so as to unpack what Epstein referred to as the “partial and uneven” democratization of science that followed from activists’ disruptive activities—activities which, as Epstein said, showed how activists were simultaneously “scary and smart,” which is to say, both capable of avoiding epistemic trespassing but at the same time willing to trespass as necessary to ensure their demands were taken seriously.