In the context of global democracy there has been a renewed interest in democratic ways of constraining the power of global governance actors. In nation-states the independent courts, timely elections and the possibility to repeal laws serve as mechanisms to constrain government. But in global governance such mechanisms are less clear, and actors are rarely held publicly accountable for failed policies or regimes. Accounts of international legitimacy and accountability often endorse transparency to achieve such accountability but they prefer reason-giving to constraint and sharing of ‘best practices’ to repeal. This paper will critically evaluate different theoretical views on the constraint of the ‘demos’ on government in domestic contexts, and explore their relevance and applicability in global governance. Three specific questions will be addressed. First, how is the power of the ‘demos’ to constrain governments conceptualized in libertarian, republican and representative accounts, focused around concepts of negative liberty, non-domination and negative power? Second, what is the relation between transparency and constraint in these three conceptualizations? And third, what are the similarities and dissimilarities between transparency and constraint in the domain of global governance? It will become clear that transparency needs to be supplemented by constraint in order to increase public trust and participation in global governance institutions, and that a representative account is most helpful as it correctly locates constraint in the institutionalization of public judgment.
