The Co-Opted City: Why Some Capital Regions Are More Corrupt Than Others

Abstract This study investigates how and why corruption and the quality of government vary across capital regions in Europe. Using newly collected data on quality of government across all EU-27 capital regions, based on the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) survey, we first show that capital regions in Europe vary considerably in their relative performance in terms of quality of government (QoG), despite often being the wealthiest and most highly educated regions in their respective countries. Using a strategic subsample of high- and low-performing capital regions in Southern and Eastern Europe—Madrid, Athens, Prague, and Bratislava—we then provide experimental evidence on the determinants of job promotion and performance among public employees. We investigate the importance of three types of connections—political, family, and geographical—compared to merit-based recruitment. Our preliminary findings show that connections, and political connections in particular, are perceived as highly important for job promotion in capital regions with lower quality of government. This finding is consistent with qualitative evidence drawn from extensive interview material with selected elites in the respective regions. Overall, we suggest that capital cities that are co-opted—where bureaucracies are politicized—are less likely to serve the public good and more likely to fail in delivering impartial and non-corrupt public services to their citizens. We also show that some types of social ties are more influential for bureaucratic performance than others.