Perceived Entitlement to Representation: Pre-Conditions of Representative Relations

This paper introduces perceived entitlement to representation as a conceptual pre-condition of political subjecthood and as a foundational element of representative relations, particularly in contexts where formal voting rights and lived political membership diverge. It argues that before any representative relationship can emerge, individuals hold socially constructed perceptions—of themselves and of others—as (not) entitled to be represented. These perceptions shape whether people see themselves and others as legitimate participants in political decision-making, thereby structuring patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the political community. Situated within the constructivist turn in representation, and building on Saward’s theory of the representative claim, the paper extends existing work by foregrounding the attitudinal and perceptual foundations that precede any representative relationship. Perceived entitlement contributes to this literature by capturing how individuals understand their own and others’ standing as potential objects of representation, prior to any representative construction. The paper defines perceived entitlement to representation as the socially constructed belief that an individual is entitled to political representation irrespective of formal voting rights. Entitlement is conceptualised as a subjective and normative perception rooted in individual and collective understandings of political voice. Such entitlement may extend across multiple political communities—for instance, when migrants feel politically entitled in both their country of residence and their country of origin. Perceived entitlement is not a stable or purely individual orientation; it is shaped by social cues, stereotypes, and group-based evaluative practices, which distinguishes it analytically from abstract rights discourse. The conceptual framework consists of two analytical dimensions. The first captures the subjective, perceptual side of entitlement. It includes self-perceptions, perceptions of others, and meta-perceptions—understandings of how one is viewed in society. These perceptions are shaped by in-group favouritism, social sorting, and circulating stereotypes that signal who is considered part of the community. Because these dynamics are intertwined in practice, they jointly form the attitudinal foundation of perceived entitlement to representation. The second dimension examines the reasoning individuals use to justify entitlement judgements. While perceptions indicate who is viewed as entitled, justificatory reasoning reveals why. Explanations refer to immediate, surface-level reasons, whereas underlying justificatory frames draw on broader normative principles—such as fairness, equal treatment, or deservingness—or empirically grounded criteria like long-term residency, language proficiency, or lived experience. These frames show how entitlement judgements blend normative and empirical reasoning and how they vary across contexts. The framework is developed in dialogue with an empirically oriented research design involving focus groups with migrants from democratic origin states in Austria and the United Kingdom. The empirical design provides the basis for refining the conceptual distinctions and guiding the identification of the attitudinal and justificatory mechanisms to be explored. Migrants serve as analytical extreme cases, making entitlement particularly visible, yet the framework is intended to travel beyond migrant populations. By combining subjective perceptions and justificatory reasoning, the concept of perceived entitlement to representation advances constructivist approaches by specifying the preconditions under which individuals understand themselves—and are understood by others—as entitled members of the represented political community.