When Speaking About Corruption Costs Votes: The Electoral Risks of Anti-Corruption Appeals

Although voters often express their dislike of corruption, anti-corruption appeals are not always electorally rewarding. Despite their growing use by political parties, research on their electoral impact remains limited, and experimental evidence from Paraguay suggests such appeals are less effective than assumed. Drawing on theories of political trust, issue ownership, and context-dependent valence appeals, we argue that the success of anti-corruption rhetoric depends on who delivers the message and the context in which it is received. In low-trust societies, where voters are already cynical, anti-corruption messages may appear hollow or hypocritical, prompting voters to punish the party. In moderately trusting societies, such appeals are less polarizing—neither strongly punished nor rewarded. In high-trust societies, voters may regard anti-corruption appeals as unnecessary or even off-putting, believing corruption is not a pressing problem. Using data from the Manifesto Project linked with ESS, V-Dem, and QoG indicators, we analyse elections in 26 European countries from 2002–2020. Our results show that anti-corruption appeals are counterproductive in low- and high-trust contexts but largely irrelevant in moderately trusting ones.