Mini-Publics in Deeply Divided Societies: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Belgium

Can deliberative mini-publics succeed where the elite has so often failed and unite deeply divided societies? For all their popularity, we know too little about what the citizens of such societies themselves think about mini-publics, and even less about the precise institutional contours they should have to be accepted in the first place. We address this question using a conjoint experiment in Belgium. In investigating differences between majority (Flemish) and minority (Francophone) group members on nine distinct design features of mini-publics, we identify common ground on most dimensions. However, two key differences persist: the majority favours proportional representation and simple majorities for decision-making, the minority equal representation and qualified decision-making rules. This means that for mini-publics to have the desired effect in deeply divided societies, there first ought to be a mutually acceptable compromise on these two particularly sensitive aspects of design.