Inter-Provincial Rivalry and Subnational Variations in State Capacity After the Mexican Revolution.

Why are countries born with greater state capacity in some regions of their territory than others? In the developing world, direct rule (a key mark of state capacity) often extends only to core areas. In contrast, peripheral regions are governed through intermediaries who shape the reach of national bureaucracies. This article argues that inter-provincial rivalry can drive successful state centralization. I compare two subnational cases in post-revolutionary Mexico, where Mexico City’s first major centralizing project (mass education) met starkly different responses. In Campeche, local bosses embraced revolutionary education early and wholeheartedly, while in neighboring Yucatán, they resisted and sabotaged it at every turn. The difference lay in Campeche’s deal with Mexico City: support for centralization in exchange for protection against Yucatán’s regional dominance. Drawing on primary and secondary sources, I use Bayesian logic to test this explanation against four alternatives: subnational government’s poverty, weakened landlords, weakened bureaucracy, and geography. Moving beyond national-level accounts of Latin American state formation, I highlight the importance of national-subnational interactions in shaping institutional outcomes within countries.