Whose Voice Counts? Formal Dissent at the IMF Executive Board, 1997–2019

Under what conditions do powerful states shape IMF deliberations when formal votes are rare and consensus is the norm? This article examines objections by Executive Directors during Article IV consultations to identify the conditions under which dissent is formally recorded and whose preferences are most salient. A new dataset of 34,162 statements from 2,510 consultations (1997–2019) shows that dissent follows a club governance logic: objections increase as policies diverge from G7 benchmarks and concentrate on large economies. At the statement level, objections focus on macroeconomic issues with clear cross-border effects – exchange rates, fiscal policy, monetary policy, and convertibility commitments – while structural reforms seldom attract dissent. Alternative explanations based on principal–agent monitoring, cheap talk, or rogue behavior receive little support. The findings show how a consensus-based international organization manages internal conflict, shedding light on multilateral cooperation in the global economy.