Accountability Through Presidential Crises? Evidence from Latin America

Impeachment is a key constitutional mechanism for holding presidents accountable in presidential democracies. Designed as a check on executive misconduct, it is regarded as a formal mechanism of horizontal accountability that serves both as a tool for removing incumbents who threaten democracy and as a deterrent against potential power abuses. Yet, as Alexander Hamilton noted more than two centuries ago, impeachment is inherently political and shaped less by legal evidence than by partisan balance. In practice, impeachment remains difficult to use, requiring supermajorities and unfolding within the high-stakes arena of presidential politics. This article revisits impeachments through the lens of the interplay between formal and informal accountability mechanisms. Drawing on cases of presidential removal in Latin America, it shows that when formal institutions prove ineffective or blocked, accountability often shifts into informal channels. Formal mechanisms give way to informal ones, with mass protests and civic mobilization demanding presidential resignations outside of constitutional procedures. The article also considers whether impeachment itself presupposes a threshold of institutionalization, occurring mainly in relatively robust democracies, but absent in hybrid or weakly democratic regimes. The article advances understanding of how formal and informal accountability interact in times of executive crisis.