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Delegation and Coalition-Building in Multi-Level-Lobbying

European Politics
Interest Groups
Regionalism
Representation
Lobbying
Florian Spohr
Universität Stuttgart
Patrick Bernhagen
Universität Stuttgart
Florian Spohr
Universität Stuttgart

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Abstract

In the European multilevel system, organized interests can pursue their goals on different layers of government, ranging from the subnational via the national to the supranational level. Multi-level-lobbying occurs when interest groups are active at levels for which they do not have ‘primary competence’ (Constantelos 2007). If their interests are challenged on another level, interest groups can apply two strategies: A first way to represent their interests on those levels on which they have no direct access to policymakers is to join or forge lobbying coalitions. Here, cooperation can be rather loose, such as information exchange and strategy coordination, or highly institutionalized as in the case of umbrella associations (Junk 2020). However, entering an alliance not only brings benefits but also requires to make compromises. For these reasons, organizations with the necessary resources can extend their organizational remit and lobby directly on other levels, not least to bypass established associations. In particular large companies increasingly have built up their own lobbying capacities on multiple levels. Against this background, our contribution addresses two research gaps. Firstly, although some studies on lobbying coalitions on the different levels exist, insights in how interest groups organize their coalitions and networks as well as divide labour across levels are lacking. Secondly, our analysis aims to contribute to hitherto inconclusive findings concerning the multi-level-lobbying of national interest groups. While some studies indicate that less non-business than business groups operate at both EU and national level (Eising et al. 2017; Kohler and Quittkat 2017), others suggest that the strategies of diffuse and specific interest groups have converged to a considerable extent (e.g., Kriesi et al. 2006; Beyers and Kerremans 2012). Empirically, we investigate the case of Germany, as the German federal system processes policies from the subnational, national and European levels. Our data stems from a survey among 1.400 interest groups and corporations from the German Land Baden-Württemberg which provides us with information about (the frequency of) organizations’ contacts with venues on the regional, national, and EU-level, as well as regarding their strategies in coalition building and interest delegation across the three levels.