After 30 years of Third Wave democratization, deficiencies in the rule of law still are the Achilles'' heel of democratic performance and quality in Latin America. While elections and other forms of political participation have become routine and the military no longer play a dominant role in political life, the rule of law has remained incomplete – truncated in the words of O''Donnell – and does not provide the mechanisms to ensure sound democratic processes. As a consequence, in most countries the civil powers created by polyarchy frequently lack the necessary monitoring and supervision, and the judiciary often cannot guarantee the citizen''s rights, or does so very unevenly. This paper discusses the role which “bad” informal institutions play in undermining the establishment and/or improvements of the rule of law. Comparing three cases (Argentina, Chile, Mexico) it first analyzes the impact of different informal institutions on the rule of law since re-democratization. Secondly, using the different strands of institutionalism, I will ask for the origin, persistence and change of these “bad” informal institutions. Thirdly, focusing on the last three decades, I will analyze the reform efforts to weaken informal institutions and their effects on the rule of law. Finally, I combine the analysis of these factors and the qualitative analysis of the actors’ constellations and their strategies that have enabled or impeded further improvements in the rule of law.
