Informational Disorder and the Discipline of Reason in Public Discourse

When we consider the present time, the volume of disinformation, and the scale at which fake news is disseminated, it becomes pertinent to ask whether it would be prudent or advisable to limit or control the agenda of public discourse. The aim of this article is to examine how Kant’s philosophy can help us to understand the nuances of this problem and to offer an alternative capable of sustaining the exercise of free citizenship and fostering the process of enlightenment, whether individual or collective, that takes place through the public use of reason. To address epistemic problems and the conditions of communication, we need the discipline of reason. For Kant, the discipline of reason is indispensable to the development of our capacity for autonomous thinking. We should not forget that, for Kant, we are confronted with an entire system of illusions and fallacies, intimately connected and unified under common principles. For this reason, in the Doctrine of Method of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents the discipline of reason as a system of precaution and self-examination. This discipline thus provides us with a normative standard that can be proposed as an alternative to several problems encountered in contemporary democracies. In addition to the discipline of reason, we must also consider the three maxims of sensus communis. These are presented as exemplary of a reflective act that considers, a priori, the mode of representation of all others, in order to weigh one’s judgment against the collective judgment of humanity. The three maxims prescribe that we, as agents, think for ourselves, think from the standpoint of everyone else, and think consistently. From this perspective, it is through the discipline of reason and this reflective act that we can navigate the constant relationship between plurality and the search for consensus in society. Within the interpretative framework of Kant’s practical philosophy, it is possible to identify at least two ways of understanding the role of discipline as presented in the first Critique. One is the position advanced by Roberta Pasquerè (2023), and the other is that of Onora O’Neill (2015). In this context, the present article is divided into three parts. In the first part, I explain the nuances of the concept of discipline in Kant and show how this concept is fundamental for thinking about alternatives to current problems. In the second part, I present the debate between Onora O’Neill and Pasquerè, within which I also articulate my own position and contributions. Finally, I offer a Kantian response to the guiding question of the investigation. To support the inquiry, Kant’s texts will be analyzed, such as, for example, the Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of the Power of Judgment, and An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?. With regard to the secondary literature, the article Kant’s political enlightenment: Free public use of reason as self-discipline (2023) by Pasquerè and the book Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy (2015) by O’Neill will be the focus of analysis.