The Impact of Direct Prime Minister Elections on Cabinet Stability: The Case of Israel

Recently, Italy has discussed the introduction of the direct prime ministerial elections. One of the reasons for this innovation is an expected cabinet stability. However, there was one example of such a system: Israel, who implemented direct elections of the PM in 2001 and repealed this policy by the amendment of their Basic Law in 2001. Factually, the directly elected PMs were in power from 1996 until 2003. The Israeli case is particularly instructive because it represents the only instance where a parliamentary democracy attempted to strengthen executive leadership through direct elections while maintaining the fundamental requirement of parliamentary confidence. This institutional innovation emerged from a peculiar set of circumstances: growing public frustration with coalition instability, the increasing power of small parties, and a desire for more decisive leadership in a system characterized by proportional representation and multi-party politics. This article examines how the introduction and subsequent abandonment of direct prime ministerial elections affected the key aspect of democratic governance: cabinet stability. We argue that contrary to reformers' expectations, direct elections paradoxically weakened the prime minister's ability to maintain stable coalitions. By creating dual sources of democratic legitimacy – one for the prime minister and another for the Knesset – the reform generated new institutional tensions that ultimately undermined its intended goals.