How Institutions Shape Emerging Technology Governance: Coalition Opportunity Structures in the CBDC Policy Subsystems of China, the US, and the EU

The rapid development of global digital finance has made Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) a key issue in international monetary governance. However, China, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU) have adopted three distinct policy paths towards CBDCs: rapid advancement, policy stalemate, and gradual development. What has led to such different policy paths surrounding a single emerging technology? While the existing Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) explains coalition competition and policy changes, it has paid limited attention to how the institutional environment shapes the policy paths of emerging technology by influencing Coalition Opportunity Structures (COS). To address this gap, this paper aims to provide a mechanistic explanation of how COS operates within emerging policy subsystems. Using a multi-case comparative design and drawing on classic ACF scholarship on COS formation, this paper identifies institutional fragmentation, technocratic autonomy, and digital infrastructure dependence as three core structural inputs shaping the opportunities and constraints embedded in COS within the CBDCs policy subsystem. Through analysis of policy debates, regulatory documents, and legislative trends, it can be observed that these institutional dimensions determine the different coalition dynamics triggered by external shocks (such as Libra) in different subsystems. China’s highly centralized structure strengthens the ability of technocratic departments to lead the development of CBDC; institutional fragmentation and partisan competition in the US have led to a long-term stalemate on the CBDC issue, prompting coalitions to shift their focus to the regulation of stablecoins; and the EU’s multi-layered governance system promotes incremental compromise, entering a cautious CBDC development phase. This paper makes contributions at two levels: theoretically, by comparing the mechanisms of China, the US, and the EU, it clarifies how institutional attributes regulate coalition interactions by shaping COS, thereby expanding the applicability of ACF in emerging policy subsystems; empirically, it offers a generalizable analytical framework for understanding the path differences of emerging technologies such as digital currencies in different political systems. (I would like this paper to be considered for the panel ‘Interaction of Actors, Ideas and Institutions in the Advocacy Coalition Framework’.)