Between Authoritarian Control and Democratic Norms: Baltic Russophones’ Perceptions of Russia’s Information Suppression

Russia has turned information control into a cornerstone of its authoritarian governance, systematically suppressing dissent and shaping information environment. While research on Russian foreign information manipulation and interference has largely focused on the reception and effects of disinformation, far less attention has been paid to how audiences perceive and interpret information suppression - deliberate actions to silence information and mute dissenting voices to consolidate power. This paper addresses this gap by examining how Russophone audiences living outside Russia perceive Russia’s media bans and broader authoritarian information control, and how these perceptions relate to democratic vulnerabilities in host societies. Focusing on Russophones in Latvia and Estonia - where Russian-speaking minorities constitute 38% and 29% of the population, respectively - we ask: how do Baltic Russophone audiences interpret Russia’s information suppression, and how do these interpretations shape normative boundaries between authoritarian and democratic information governance? Drawing on securitisation theory and the literature on strategic communication, we conceptualize audience perceptions as a reception-oriented dimension of security framing. Our analysis reveals that perceptions of information suppression are relational: audiences do not evaluate Russian practices in isolation but interpret them through cross-context comparisons with information controls and security-driven media restrictions in democratic states. This relational framing highlights a micro-level mechanism through which information disorder contributes to democratic vulnerabilities, by blurring normative distinctions between authoritarian censorship and democratic regulation. Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative audience-centred approach to move beyond elite discourse and capture everyday meaning-making. We conducted online focus groups in July 2025 with 55 Russophone participants in Latvia and Estonia, segmented by migration cohort: (1) pre-1991 residents and descendants; (2) post-1991 immigrants; and (3) arrivals after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Participants compared freedom of expression and access to information across Russia, their host countries, Ukraine, Western democracies, and China, enabling us to trace how perceptions of authoritarian media control emerge in everyday reasoning. Findings reveal substantial heterogeneity shaped by migration history and national context. Some participants frame Russia’s media bans as authoritarian repression, while others justify them as pragmatic instruments of stability. Crucially, many do not differentiate between Russia’s suppression of oppositional voices and security-driven media restrictions in Ukraine and the Baltic states. This convergence resonates with Russian disinformation narratives of “no objective, absolute truth,” fostering confusion, cynicism, and distrust in democratic institutions. Recent migrants are more critical of Russia, while long-standing residents often express scepticism toward host-state media regulation. National differences also emerge: Latvian participants report higher self-censorship and fear of sanctions, whereas Estonian participants describe a more moderate environment. By highlighting these cross-context comparisons, the study shows how Russia’s information suppression resonates beyond its borders, shaping attitudes toward authoritarianism and perceptions of the legitimacy of democratic responses to information warfare. It contributes to debates on strategic communication, information disorder, and democratic vulnerabilities by identifying a micro-level mechanism through which security-driven policies in democratic states may unintentionally undermine institutional trust, reduce news engagement, and weaken democratic accountability among minority populations.