The past couple of decades, we have witnessed an avalanche of reforms in several OECD countries, and most of them were inspired by the new public management (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). Various forms of performance management systems have been set up, both at the organizational and the individual level. Performance agreements have been introduced for top civil servants, defining their objectives to be met. Those reforms may have impacted the type of relations between politicians and senior officials as the traditional hierarchical steering relationship has been replaced by a contractual steering relationship (Putseys & Hondeghem, 2002). Following Christopher Hood’s typology of public service bargains (PSB), we assume that performance management systems have contributed to a more managerial public service bargain. This implies a change in rewards, competencies and loyalty/responsibility (Hood & Lodge, 2006). The central question in this paper is: what is the impact of the introduction of performance management systems for the senior civil servants on the public service bargains? The paper will compare the situation in Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Belgium. Our data are based upon surveys and interviews conducted in each country during Summer and Fall 2009. First, we discuss the theoretical framework for this paper: the concept of public service bargains and its components. We explain the methodology we have used. Subsequently, we discuss the performance management systems introduced for senior civil servants. Finally, we analyse their impact on the public service bargains. We conclude by reflecting on Christopher Hood’s typology of public service bargains.
