A Normative Approach to Distinguishing Between Four Fundamental Social Relationships: A New Conceptual Analysis of Influence, Authority, Power, & Domination

This paper addresses a long-standing problem in political theory: the concept of power. Despite widespread acknowledgment that power is central to modern societies (Russell 1938; Mann 1986; Swartz 1997), after more than sixty years the ‘power debates’ remain cluttered with many “unsettled issues” (Baldwin 2020). But without a functioning concept of power, or a clear understanding of how it differs from influence, authority, and domination, how can we establish the conceptual foundations of legitimate political authority? This paper introduces a new framework to distinguish between influence, authority, power, and domination (the “IAPD framework”). The framework helps to overcome three obstacles that continue to impede clear conceptualizations of these four social relationships. The first is a practical error wherein scholars state that power is a “relationship” but subsequently treat it as a resource or capacity (Clegg 1989; Wrong 1995). Second, there is an illusion that power and authority can be defined objectively without reference to an explicitly specified community (Lukes 2005). Third, and most importantly, is a failure to distinguish power clearly from the other three fundamental relationships. The IAPD framework defines the four relationships based on five properties: (1) membership/identity, concerning in-group/out-group boundaries (Plato’s The Republic; Popper 1945); (2) scope, or the domain of the relationship (Dahl 1987); (3) intensity, the emotional impact and the depth of affect typically involved in the relationship (Mann 1986); (4) sanction, the extent to which punishment, reward, clemency, and deprivation are considered acceptable within the relationship (Lasswell & Kaplan 1950; Foucault 2003; Machiavelli 2014); and (5) well-being, the degree to which the objective interests and subjective experiences of participants are considered by the other (Gaventa 1986; Sen 2000; Wilkinson & Pickett 2009). Analyzing specific relationships along these five properties reveals key characteristics that enable valid and reliable categorization. For instance, in relationships of influence, a distinguishing feature is genuine, mutual concern for the other’s well-being. In relationships of authority, figure A’s scope of expertise is limited, and A has an obligation to prioritize B’s well-being while respecting community-established norms. The distinguishing characteristic of relationships of power is that sanction—particularly punishment—is acceptable within the legal and normative boundaries determined by the community. For example, in the United States, Boss A can legally fire Worker B without cause, whereas in France such an action requires a legally acceptable explanation. In both cases, however, the scope of Boss A’s punitive capacity is limited to the employment relationship. By contrast, when A’s capacity to punish and deprive B is intense and its scope pervasive, the relationship can clearly be categorized as one of domination. The IAPD framework promotes more precise communication, aligns with empirical observations, and generates a wide range of research questions. As such, it meets standard criteria for sound conceptual analysis (Cohen 1980). It also explains the clear normative preferences among the four relationships. This conceptual clarity might help to advance discussions about how to preserve an open, democratic society in the face of growing authoritarianism.