Presidential Decrees as Instruments of Autocratization: The Case of Turkey’s Institutional Transformation

This paper examines the role of presidential decrees (cumhurbaşkanlığı kararnameleri, CBKs) in reshaping executive power under Turkey’s post-2018 presidential system. Focusing on 147 decrees issued during President Erdoğan’s first term (2018–2023), the analysis explores how decree authority has contributed to the consolidation of presidential dominance and the reconfiguration of institutional checks and balances. Drawing on Karl Loewenstein’s theory of autocracy, the paper identifies three interrelated dynamics—centralization of executive authority, erosion of institutional oversight, and constraints on crisis responsiveness—through which CBKs have transformed the functioning of the state. Empirically, it traces the impact of presidential decrees across five domains: policymaking, institutional structuring, civil service regulation, financial administration, and oversight mechanisms. The Turkish case illustrates how presidential decree powers can operate as instruments of autocratization within formally constitutional presidential regimes. By situating Turkey within broader debates on presidentialism, executive lawmaking, and democratic backsliding, the paper contributes to comparative discussions on the role of presidents in driving regime transformation.