Social Hierarchy, Authority, and the Justification of Democracy

Relational egalitarianism has since its beginnings taken for granted that there is a direct connection between the ideal of relational equality and democratic rule. This connection was in its inception seen as a core difference to the distributive paradigm and luck egalitarianism (Anderson 1999; Young 1990; Scheffler 2003). Recently, Niko Kolodny (2023) has provided a detailed account of the meaning and value of noninferiority and how it can explain the value of democracy. According to him, democracy answers the fundamental moral claim against being treated as an inferior. However, significant objections have been raised to Kolodny’s argument and the broader idea that the norm of “egalitarian relations” on its own can justify democracy as an ideal of equal political power (Viehoff 2019; Zuehl 2024). These objections pose the question of whether egalitarian relations or nonhierarchy is a sufficient foundation for justifying democracy. This paper argues that while it is true that a simple idea of equality or nonhierarchy cannot, on its own, explain the value of democracy, a more complex conception of nonhierarchy as respect for the equal authority of persons can. A richer and more robust idea of equality is needed to explain what nonhierarchy as a moral notion means, why it is of fundamental importance, and to justify democracy. I show that Daniel Viehoff’s and Jake Zuehl’s respective challenges to the noninstrumental argument for democracy espoused by Kolodny both rely on an assumption of normative asymmetry between “equal consideration” and “equal authority,” which gives moral priority to the former. Meeting their challenges therefore requires a conceptual and normative argument against this normative asymmetry assumption. I develop such an argument grounded in a conception of respect for persons, which I call respect for equal authority. Respect for equal authority entails respect for persons as autonomous, responsible, and rational agents who can determine their own good, demand justice from others, and participate in providing justice for all. Thus, equal respect for authority requires both equal concern for the interests of everyone as objects of justice and equal opportunity to participate in common decision making about the character of their relationships, as agents and makers of justice. The paper is structured around three theses. First, morally and sociologically salient hierarchy is constituted not merely by disparities of esteem or brute power, but by inequalities of social power and authority. Second, nonhierarchy has fundamental value when it expresses and realizes respect for the moral power of persons as authorities both in their own lives and as equal participants in determining matters of common concern. Third, the norm of respect for persons as equal authorities provides a direct and compelling justification of democracy. This account clarifies the grounding of relational egalitarianism in a normative conception of the person and aligns more closely with its original point: ending politically imposed oppression.