The EU’s Performative Power in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, an increased engagement of the EU in facilitating the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue can be observed. The Dialogue, although ongoing since 2011, has yielded a limited number of tangible results, most of which remain unimplemented or contested by local Kosovar or Serb actors. While research has recognized that this is due to the “constructive ambiguity” of the agreements, few scholars pay attention to the asymmetrical power relations and dynamics underlying the Dialogue as an explanation for the lack of implementation. While the EU is undeniably a powerful actor in its neighborhood, it has failed to secure the implementation of agreements reached in the Dialogue, most notably the most recent Ohrid agreement from 2023. In fact, the state of the Dialogue (and Kosovo-Serbia relations) has never been worse. This article offers a novel post-structuralist framework of performative power to explain why this is the case. While the EU has both relational and discursive power (through its enlargement framework, resting on conditionality and Europeanization), it lacks performative power, i.e. power to produce material effects on the ground. To demonstrate the core argument, this article analyzes the state of implementation of Dialogue agreements reached thus far. It particularly highlights moments of contestation by local actors, such as Kosovar or Serb communities, challenging the EU’s agenda on the implementation of the Ohrid agreement during the North Kosovo crisis (2022-2025). The article demonstrates that the EU is, in a sense, powerless in this Dialogue, since its success hinges on local implementation. Given the failure of EU conditionality and challenges to Europeanization in both Serbia and Kosovo, local actors remain the real power-brokers, especially their subversive agency.