The Ethics of the Refugee Rentier State

Due in part to increasingly vehement anti-migration sentiment, affluent democracies in the Global North have become increasingly hostile to hosting refugees. They have, consequently, doubled-down on efforts to contain refugees within the Global South. A key part of this strategy has been the externalization of ‘protection’ via agreements with third-countries who are promised benefits in exchange for hosting refugees. The result has been the rise of refugee rentier states: states that employ their position as hosts to extract revenue from other state or non-state actors in order to maintain these populations within their borders. Although such arrangements are, as a matter of ideal justice, morally impermissible, rent-seeking is nevertheless likely to remain a central feature of contemporary migration politics for many years to come. Viewed from the perspective of non-ideal migration politics, the practice raises acute moral questions. On the one hand, the promise of a rent gives poor states an incentive to host refugees and potentially benefits states in the Global South. On the other hand, this practice commodifies refugees and allows states in the Global North to shirk their responsibilities. This paper critically explores how states in the Global North and the Global South should navigate the moral questions surrounding rent-extraction dynamics. Specifically, it explores whether and under what conditions states in the Global South are permitted to extract rents in exchange for hosting refugees, despite the moral hazards this practice generates.