Econocratic Bodies and Populist Governments – A Research Agenda

Recent years have witnessed the rise of populist and anti-system politics in advanced democracies, with some populist leaders and parties winning elections, joining and even forming governing coalitions. Crucially, the rise of populists to power has been taking place in an age of technocratic decision-making. Especially in economic policy, rules and institutions limit the discretion of elected officials and delegate it to non-elected bodies like independent central banks and autonomous regulators, whose legitimacy is based on independent decision-making guided by economic expertise. This means that populists in power might face the opposition not only of rival parties and politicians, but also of economic technocratic – hereafter ‘econocratic’ – bodies. Indeed, various studies have shown how populism threatens and seeks to weaken econocratic bodies and independent public service in general, and how the latter respond to populist pressures. But econocratic bodies are not necessarily passive or reactive actors; rather, they are known as political actors willing to promote their own agenda and who possess relatively vast power resources, not least the ability to sway public discourse and beliefs as well as market trends. The paper offers an analytical framework for assessing and comprehending the political interaction between populist governments and econocratic bodies. How do populist governments interact with econocratic bodies, and with what implications for democracy, governance and economic policy and outcomes? Bringing together insights from comparative politics, public administration and political economy, our framework highlights the political agency of econocratic bodies facing populist governments and the different power resources econocratic bodies can draw upon in this interaction.