Militant Democracy: Towards the History of an Idea

According to most definitions, militant democracy is narrowly defined as a practice that applies legal restrictions on political expression and participation to curb extremist actors within a democratic regime. Its association with rights restrictions raises various dilemmas associated with the paradox of democratic self-injury—the violation of democratic norms for the purposes of preserving those norms. The concept of militant democracy us normally associated with Karl Loewenstein and a seminal pair of papers authored by him in 1937. But Loewenstein does not provide a formal definition of militant democracy in these papers, and his use of the term is broader than the narrow definition employed today. More important is the fact that contrary to what the current literature suggests, the concept of militant democracy does not originate with Loewenstein. This paper undertakes a preliminary exploration of the history of the concept, with a focus upon its pre-Loewenstein origins. (Its post-Loewenstein evolution is better understood and will be examined further in other work.) It tracks usage of the term in both English and French, a practice dating back to the early 19th century. (The German usage of the term appears to have originated as an import from Loewenstein.) The French usage is particularly associated with the French rebellions during the July Monarchy (1830-1850) that resulted in the Second Republic, while the English usage has a more generalized usage. The paper then offers some preliminary conclusions regarding how the concept has evolved over time. Through a genealogical analysis, the paper presents four conceptions of militant democracy, two “classical” ones which are of offensive nature, and two “contemporary” ones which are of defensive nature. Under the first offensive conception, political associations and individuals make ideas triumph by force; under the second offensive conception, democracy assertively expands and consolidates the democratic franchise; under the third defensive conception, institutions place formal legal restrictions on antidemocratic groups and associations; under the fourth defensive conception, democracy adopts a holistic and on-going approach to its defence, whereby becoming defensive. This chapter shows that a militant democracy can be both defensive and offensive in nature; put another way, it can be associated either with the protection of existing democracy or with the consolidation and advancement of democracy beyond existing practice. The latter usage of the term, which is associated with the classical conceptions, makes possible democratic imaginaries that go beyond the status quo¬-oriented approach of both Loewenstein and his successors.