Propaganda That Doesn’t Look Political: Experimental Evidence on Influencer-Based Pro-Russian Propaganda

How does ostensibly apolitical pro-Russian content disseminated by social media influencers (SMIs) shape Western audience attitudes toward Russia? While existing research on foreign influence operations has focused primarily on state-linked media outlets, troll farms, and bots, far less is known about the persuasive effects of influencer-driven propaganda that is embedded in seemingly non-political, lifestyle-oriented content. Building on recent investigations into the "Doppelganger" campaign and RT networks, this paper argues that Russian influence operations have entered a new phase characterised by an emerging "influencer-for-hire" model.  Conceptually, the paper advances the literature on digital authoritarianism, as well as political and cognitive warfare by shifting attention from overt disinformation to implicit forms of persuasion. Crucially, this strategy allows geopolitical narratives, particularly those centred on "traditional values," moral conservatism, and cultural identity, to be embedded within ostensibly apolitical content, thereby circumventing audience skepticism and resistance typically triggered by explicit propaganda.  Empirically, the study presents findings from a pre-registered, between-subjects single-wave survey experiment conducted among U.S. social media users. Participants were randomly assigned to view real pro-Russian propaganda on a mock Instagram feed under one of three conditions: 1) (ostensibly) apolitical content embedding "traditional values," 2) explicitly political pro-Russia messages, or 3) neutral content (control). Post-treatment outcomes, measured immediately after exposure, capture a battery of affective, ideological, and geopolitical indicators of pro-Russian attitudes.  This design allows for a causal comparison between implicit and explicit modes of foreign influence, an empirical distinction that has remained largely untested in the existing literature. By isolating the persuasive effects of apolitical influencer content, the paper provides the first experimental evidence on whether such material can meaningfully shift Western audiences’ perceptions of Russia, and whether it does so more effectively than overt political propaganda. The findings have broader implications for understanding how authoritarian regimes adapt influence strategies to platform logistics and influencer cultures, and they call for a rethinking of how democratic societies conceptualise, detect, and counter contemporary digital disinformation campaigns.