Exploring the Bargaining Dynamics of the Executive Triangle in Denmark

This paper examines the executive triangle in Denmark, comprising ministers, top civil servants, and ministerial advisers, through the lens of Public Service Bargains (PSB) (Hood & Lodge, 2006). Theoretically, it integrates two complementary perspectives: the original PSB framework, which analyzes ministers’ relationships with their agents, including merit-based civil servants and politically appointed advisers (Hood & Lodge, 2006), and the more recent Public Service Advisers Bargain (PSAB), which focuses on the interaction and negotiated roles between civil servants and advisers (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2017; Shaw & Salomonsen, 2023). Situated within a parliamentary democracy traditionally characterized by coalition and minority governments, Denmark’s executive operates with a merit-based civil service that is comparatively rather functionally politicized, serving next to a small cadre of ministerial advisers, indicating limited formal politicization. The executive triangle functions under rather limited formally defined role expectations, resulting in informal and variable bargains across the executive. Drawing on interviews with actors within the executive triangle, collected as part of the Corex COST Action, this paper explores how these bargains are constructed and maintained in practice as well as identify aspect providing for within executive variation across PSABs in Denmark.