Turkish Party Structures Within the National-Organisational Centre: A Comparative Country-Level Analysis Based on the Political Party Database Project

This study examines organisational structures at both the national executive and parliamentary levels across five major political parties represented in the Turkish parliament, drawing on Round 3 data from the Political Party Database Project. To ensure comprehensive representation of ideological and organisational diversity within the party system, the analysis includes the conservative-populist ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP), the social democratic main opposition Republican People’s Party (RPP), the nationalist right-wing opposition Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) and Good Party (GP), as well as the pro-Kurdish ethnic People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The analysis investigates the mutual influence, interdependence, and institutional embeddedness among key elements of central and parliamentary party organisations, with particular focus on the party leader, the CEC, and the parliamentary group variables. Key similarities and differences across Turkish parties are identified through the analysis. The world’s first law on political parties, enacted in Turkiye, sets only a minimum number of members for the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and allows flexibility for the maximum. This preference to set membership numbers near the statutory minimum threshold appears to reflect a desire to limit CEC membership to facilitate more effective control and coordination. Furthermore, the law grants political parties broad discretion regarding the names, numbers, and composition of headquarters organisations. Despite these discretionary powers, all parties continue to employ a model with only two central organisational units: one for the CEC and one for the Party Assembly, consistent with findings from PPDB Round 2. The authority of party leaders to directly appoint CEC members is absent in the NMP and PDP, while it is nearly absolute in the JDP, RPP, and GP. Based on these considerations, the formation of the CEC can be analysed along two axes: one characterized by complete leader control, and the other by the absence of such control. Additionally, approximately 50% of CEC members across all parties also serve as MPs. The data indicate that members of the CEC are consistently and substantially represented as MPs in the parliament; however, differentiation between parties remains minimal. A significant proportion of CEC members attain this position prior to being elected to parliament, suggesting that CEC membership significantly increases the likelihood of becoming an MP in subsequent general elections. Overall, this study offers a comprehensive institutional analysis of the ways in which centralisation, parliamentarisation, and leadership dominance influence internal party power structures in contemporary Turkey. Taken together, in conjunction with the existing literature this study examines these findings within the relevant institutional and political context and serves as a pilot for future research once the dataset becomes available.