The Prevention Cycle: State Investments in Preventing System Risks Over Time

State investment in the prevention of systemic risks—threats to critical societal systems—is crucial for long-term resilience, yet the political drivers of preventive policy remain insufficiently understood. This paper addresses that gap by examining how governments allocate resources to risk prevention over time, showing that preventive investments tend to follow a cyclical “boom-and-bust” pattern rather than a steady trajectory. When a major crisis or disaster strikes, it sharply increases public and political support for costly preventive measures, triggering a surge in preventive spending. As the immediate threat fades and public attention declines, these investments gradually erode, entering a downturn phase of what this paper terms the prevention cycle. As a result, initial post-crisis policy gains are frequently not sustained, leaving societies vulnerable and shifting large costs onto future generations. The paper develops a theoretical framework of the prevention cycle and demonstrates its operation across multiple domains of risk governance. Comparative case studies—including counterterrorism policy after 9/11, nuclear energy regulation after the Fukushima disaster, and flood protection after Hurricane Katrina—show a consistent pattern: sharp post-crisis increases in preventive efforts followed by gradual retrenchment. Although each policy area has its own dynamics, similar political mechanisms recur across cases. Intense media attention and heightened public risk perception create short-lived windows for policy action, which are followed by declining salience, competing budgetary priorities, and political incentives to divert resources elsewhere. These dynamics are reinforced by cognitive biases that lead both citizens and policymakers to underestimate low-probability but high-impact risks once time has passed since the last disaster. While some post-crisis adjustment may reflect learning or efficiency concerns, the overall cycle systematically undermines sustained investment in prevention. These findings have direct implications for contemporary debates on crisis governance, state capacity, and public policy learning. They show that even when states respond decisively to crises, democratic political systems struggle to maintain long-term preparedness once the sense of urgency dissipates. The prevention cycle thus represents a structural weakness in how modern governments manage systemic risks. The paper concludes that breaking this cycle requires stronger institutional mechanisms for embedding long-term risk assessment and prevention into routine policymaking, such as more autonomous expert bodies, stable funding arrangements, and governance frameworks that insulate preventive policy from short-term political pressures. In doing so, the study contributes to emerging research on the politics of crisis management by highlighting how political dynamics shape not only emergency responses, but also the long-term sustainability of risk prevention.