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Russian Intervention in Africa: The Wagner Group in the Central African Republic

Africa
Conflict
International Relations
Political Economy
Political Violence
Security
David Maher
University of Salford
David Maher
University of Salford

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Abstract

Russia has increasingly employed Private Military Companies (PMCs) and semi-state armed forces in key strategic areas of Africa. This includes activities in the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Sudan. This paper adopts a political economy approach to analyse Russia’s use of such groups, particularly its use of the Wagner Group. It focuses on a case study of the CAR and considers the interplay of Russia’s political and economic motivations. The paper challenges a theory that Russia’s use of the Wagner Group is concentrated on securing the CAR’s diamond mines. According to this theory, Russia aims to use profits from the diamond trade to help fund the war in Ukraine. In contrast, the article argues that in the short-term, political goals such as regime consolidation are the more immediate aims of the Russian state. However, in the longer term, Russia’s use of PMCs/Wagner Group forms part of a wider strategy of augmenting Russia’s influence and its position in Africa. Economic motivations – such as bolstering Russia’s global position in terms of natural resource extraction and exports – are also important considerations of the Russian government; however, there is little evidence to suggest that Russia is using the Wagner Group in the CAR to financially support its military intervention in Ukraine. The article attempts to foreground the importance of analysing both the political and economic spheres to understand why Russia militarily intervenes in the Global South and why the Russian government employs PMCs/semi state armed groups for particular theatres of operations. The article goes on to argue that Russian foreign policy is underpinned by a logic that considers both the political and economic advantages of employing PMCs/semi-state armed groups in areas of strategic interest. This is linked to a ‘dual logic’ of Russian foreign policy that aims to integrate the interests of key regional actors into transnational energy networks, while simultaneous bolstering Russia’s regional dominance within these networks. Nevertheless, while there is an interplay between political and economic motivations, the paper ultimately argues that Russia’s strategy aims to bolster its position as a great power in the Global Political Economy.