Autocratization and the Dynamics of Pro-Governmental Mobilization

There has been a developing interest in the mechanisms of how autocratizing regimes strategically mobilize loyalist groups to deter opposition, raise collective action costs, and signal regime strength. Pro-governmental violence in times of autocratization is generally understudied, as the scholarly attention was predominantly concerned with issues of anti-regime violence. Thus, existing theories on the role of pro-governmental actors in autocratization remain weak. The study draws on literature on regime stability, autocratization, protest repression, pro-governmental violence and state-mobilized movements. I argue that erosion actors may facilitate pro-governmental mobilization as a strategic tool for regime survival by increasing the costs of dissent and reinforcing state power through loyalist movements within civil society. This paper develops an actor-centered and relational theory and tests it on the case of Bangladesh under the Awami League regime (2009–2024) comparing reactive phases of protest response and proactive control and repression of the opposition. In the case of Bangladesh, pro-governmental mobilization of groups like the Chhatra League (the student wing of the former governing political party Awami League) emerged to counter dissent. Drawing on the qualitative method process tracing and triangulating in-depth semi-structured interviews with protesters and experts with written primary and secondary sources, I show that the regimes interest in controlling the streets goes beyond mere repression, they actively seek to rally their supports. Furthermor, there are incentives to mobilize pro-governmental violence not only for the regime but also for the students. By investigating how pro-governmental mobilization is used by the incumbent during episodes of autocratization and how it shapes contentious politics, this study contributes to closing critical gaps in the research.