Epistemic Modesty or Epistemic Hubris – On Democratic Virtues in Ideal and Nonideal Conditions

What I call the virtue of epistemic modesty requires us to acknowledge the ways in which epistemic limitations and non-conscious biases affect our moral and factual judgments when engaging in democratic dialogue. The paper argues a) that epistemic modesty should be recognized as a democratic virtue on a wide range of democracy models, and b) that, in nonideal conditions of epistemic injustice, displaying this virtue may come at too high cost for the epistemically disadvantaged. Since acknowledging cognitive limitations may enhance the effects of epistemic injustice, epistemic hubris is sometimes an adequate response to such conditions. I further argue c) that to be deprived of the opportunity to display the virtue of epistemic modesty adds to the burdens suffered by victims of epistemic injustice. My paper brings together the literatures on democratic virtues and epistemic injustice, and contributes new insights to both fields.