Collaborative Governance in Dutch Public Health Nutrition Policymaking: Unravelling the Process Leading to the Adoption of a Front-Of-Pack Labelling Policy

Introduction: Dutch public health nutrition policy processes are generally characterised by a collaborative governance approach. Although collaborative arenas can mobilise diverse expertise and enable context-sensitive policies, they are vulnerable to capture, lowest-common-denominator outcomes, and backstage lobbying that weakens public interest measures. Whether collaborative governance delivers meaningful results depends on how well structural risks are mitigated and whether power asymmetries are managed rather than reproduced. A case illustrating collaborative governance in the Netherlands is the process leading to the 2024 adoption of a front-of-pack food labelling (FoPL) policy. FoPLs simplify nutrition information to support healthier consumer choices. Development of the current FoPL policy started in 2018 as a joint commitment by the government, civil society, and industry. However, the policy is heavily criticised by public health experts as it is unlikely to contribute to improving population health. To shed light on how policymaking dynamics influenced the characteristics of the enacted policy, this study aims to examine the collaborative governance process that shaped it. Methods: This ongoing case study draws on the Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance and combines document analysis with stakeholder interviews. Documents, including minutes of meetings and e-mail correspondence between stakeholders, are drawn from publicly available sources and obtained through a freedom of information request at the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. Interviews are conducted with stakeholders representing health organisations, academics, food processors, retail, and consultancy (preliminary n = 16). The framework guides the analysis, enabling systematic exploration of collaborative governance and the translation of process into policy output. Results: Preliminary results highlight barriers that undermined effective collaboration. Government officials provided limited leadership, leaving space for other actors to steer the process. Despite a shared sense of interdependence, trust among stakeholders was low, rooted in previous failed FoPL initiatives and persistent tensions. This made the policy politically sensitive, reinforcing a compromise-driven approach based on adhering to procedural and institutional arrangements. A four-year delay in policy enactment led to fluctuating commitment and repeated revisions of (budgetary) plans. Throughout the process, goals, expectations and key policy concepts remained ill-defined, with little consensus achieved. These process dynamics ultimately shaped the FoPL policy, producing a compromise that reflected procedural pressures and power imbalances rather than a shared, evidence‑based vision. Conclusion: The Dutch FoPL policy case illustrates how collaborative governance can be undermined by interactions between mistrust, procedural and institutional pressures, weak leadership, and ill-defined objectives. Consequently, policies may insufficiently advance the outcomes they were designed to achieve. With analyses still ongoing, the insights to be presented will provide a novel contribution to debates on how actor interactions, institutional arrangements, and contested ideas shape collaborative policymaking.