Preference Formation on EU Integration in Candidate Countries: the Cases of Ukraine and Serbia

Crises in various candidate countries to the EU may jeopardize the progress of EU enlargement, but it may also drive public support for EU accession. Armed conflicts and major protest movements in the EU’s periphery put significant pressure on these countries’ respective domestic governments, either by preventing them from meeting the demands of EU enlargement, or by pushing their citizenries to seek external or supranational bodies to help them manage domestic crises. This article investigates two mechanisms by which public preferences for EU/non-EU relations are influenced - comparative trust and national/cultural identity. It uses the cases of Ukraine and Serbia to analyze the relationship between trust and preferences for various future scenarios of EU/non-EU relations, which represent various levels, intensities, and foci of European integration (data expected to be ready for analysis in July-August 2026). The more versatile nature of scenario preference questions allows for more detailed and informative findings, as opposed to the more commonly employed but one-dimensional pro- or anti-EU public opinion measures. For the first mechanism, we expect that citizens with lower domestic trust will generally prefer scenarios of deeper integration with the rest of Europe, but we anticipate significant differences between the two countries regarding the main purpose, focus, or method of integration. We also expect that trust in non-EU countries such as Russia or China will not necessarily prevent citizens from preferring pro-integration scenarios, but may decrease commitment to EU membership as opposed to other forms of integration. For the second mechanism, as crises of both domestic and geopolitical nature often increase individuals’ strength of national identity or cultural pride, we expect that strong national identities may have a profound and usually negative influence on one’s desire for supranational governance or regional integration. This article will analyze the effects of factors such as exclusive national self-identification, sentiments of cultural superiority, and religiosity on preferences for various EU/non-EU relations scenarios. We expect that all of these factors will be negatively related with scenarios that entail more EU or European integration, but that it will depend heavily on the focus or intensity of integration specified in each scenario.