The Behavioral Effect of Political Trust on Democratic Resilience: Evidence from Latin America

What is the impact of low political trust on democratic resilience in Latin America? While traditional literature has long argued that low trust in political institutions undermines democracy, contemporary scholarship suggests that declining trust may also stimulate civic engagement and active democratic behavior. The central question of this article is whether low political trust, echoing Hirschman’s loyalty notion, contributes to democratic backsliding or, if under certain conditions, it may foster resilience by motivating citizens to act for accountability and institutional reform. In this sense, this study sheds light on the behavioral consequences of low political trust on democratic resilience, an area that remains largely underexplored. I argue that low trust in democratic institutions can have dual consequences for democracy in Latin America. On the one hand, low trust can increase citizens’ tolerance for anti-democratic practices and openness to authoritarian or hybrid regimes, particularly among socioeconomically vulnerable groups. On the other hand, low trust may foster civic engagement and active democratic citizenship when individuals perceive opportunities to influence institutions and hold elites accountable. Thus, the effect of low trust on democracy is contingent on structural inequalities, institutional fragility, and access to channels of political influence. To provide evidence for this argument, I analyze the case of Latin America using a combination of survey and experimental data. I rely on observational data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP, 2004-2023) to examine how low trust in democratic institutions interacts with socioeconomic inequality to influence two key outcomes: (1) tolerance for anti-democratic and coercive practices, and (2) engagement in civic and political action aimed at strengthening democratic norms. In addition, I conduct a pilot online conjoint experiment (N=150) in Ecuador and Chile in which participants are presented with hypothetical institutional profiles varying along four attributes: perceived corruption, efficiency of response to citizen needs, local inequality, and regime type. For each profile, respondents indicate their willingness to (1) accept actions that bypass democratic rules and (2) engage in civic or political action to hold authorities accountable. This design allows to test how low trust interacts with structural inequality and institutional performance to shape citizens’ behavioral responses. Preliminary findings suggest that low trust significantly increases acceptance of anti-democratic actions, particularly among low-income, rural, and marginalized populations. Conversely, higher institutional trust is associated with greater civic engagement, including participation in local associations, collective action, and advocacy for institutional accountability. The conjoint experiment further reveals that exposure to information highlighting institutional responsiveness can partially offset the negative effects of low trust, encouraging engagement rather than exit. These results suggest that low trust does not automatically foster democratic backsliding but rather interacts with inequality and institutional context to shape citizens’ behavioral responses.