The Anomalous Effects of Apparentement in Israeli National and Local Elections

One of the well-known yet still seriously understudied anomalies of proportional electoral systems have to do with the consequences of apparentement lists. Two important studies on apperentements reach fundamentally different conclusions about their effects. Based on the Swiss data, Bochsler (2010) finds that apparentements systematically benefit larger parties which in turn incentivizes smaller parties to for such lists together with other smaller parties. Conversely, based on the data from German local elections, Pukelshim and Leutgäb (2013) find that the effects of apparentment are fundamentally unpredictable have a lottery-like nature because of the “plethora of ways as to how a set of lists may be partitioned into different apparentements (128).” My paper will study apparentements in Israel, a well-known case of an extreme proportional system (Rahat and Hazan 2005) that has used and allowed a restricted form of apparentements both in national and local elections since 1949. Israeli apparentements are restricted in that only two lists are allowed to enter such an arrangement. Keeping with the theme of the section, my paper will examine the frequency and the reasons that have led apparentements to violate monotonicity and distort the proportional allocation of seats among party list. References Bochsler, Daniel. "Who gains from apparentments under D’Hondt?." Electoral Studies 29, no. 4 (2010): 617-627 Pukelsheim, Friedrich, and Peter Leutgäb. "List apparentements in local elections: A lottery." In Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After, pp. 123-135. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. Rahat, Gideon, and Reuven Y. Hazan. "Israel: The politics of an extreme electoral system." The politics of electoral systems (2005): 333-351.