When Inclusion Fails: Authoritarian Participation and the Normative Logic of Inclusion and Exclusion Across Varieties of International Organizations

The growing influence of authoritarian and backsliding regimes within international organizations (IOs) has intensified concerns about how membership shapes global governance. These developments stand in sharp contrast to the dominant normative literature on the legitimacy of IOs, which treats inclusion as a central requirement for input legitimacy. Many theories begin from the all-affected principle, the idea that those affected by institutional rules should have (equal) opportunities to shape them. The literature recognizes that inclusion is difficult to realize, given that not all states represent their citizens and global publics lack established participation channels and offers alternative models of approximation. These include constrained democratic state delegation, accountability chains linking international institutions back to domestic democratic publics, civil society and stakeholder participation, and transnational deliberation. Despite their differences, dominant normative accounts share the assumption that more inclusive international institutions have a higher degree of input-legitimacy and hence are, other things equal, more legitimate. We argue that this assumption needs to be rethought. We propose a more differentiated account to determine when inclusion is normatively required and when exclusion may be permissible or even necessary. First, as recent normative work shows, the form and stringency of inclusion appropriate to an IO depend on the type of tasks it performs and the degree of political power it exercises. Second, empirical research demonstrates that inclusion can involve substantial risks, particularly in heterogeneous organizations where authoritarian members can dilute or contest democratic norms, obstruct accountability mechanisms, and redirect institutional purposes. These risks matter normatively, because they undermine both the organization’s ability to fulfill its functions (output) and its capacity to uphold fair representation and contestation (input). Moreover, they matter not only as countervailing considerations that determine the overall balance of reasons for (or against) inclusion but as considerations that may undermine even pro tanto input-legitimacy based reasons for the inclusion of a particular state in a particular IO . This article develops an empirically-grounded normative framework for assessing inclusion and exclusion in IOs. We argue that the permissibility, and at times the requirement, of exclusion depends on the organization’s scope, issue area, and membership structure. Authoritarian-dominated organizations, mixed-membership multilateral institutions, and democratic organizations face distinct normative challenges. Drawing on theories of militant democracy and debates over the restriction of membership rights in the EU, we specify when limiting participation can be justified. Building on the empirical literature, we show how the risks of inclusion, such as authoritarian influence, norm subversion, and the obstruction of accountability can challenge even the pro tanto case for inclusion. Inclusion does not always improve input-legitimacy. Yet, the risks of exclusion, including reduced organizational reach, weaker democracy promotion, and incentives for authoritarian states to form alternative “dictators’ clubs” can also not be neglected. This analysis offers a more refined account of when IOs should include, constrain, or exclude non-democratic states.