A prominent topic in literature on welfare state retrenchment is how governments avoid cutbacks or at least try to avoid blame. This proposed paper investigates the role of governmentally appointed commissions in processes of welfare state restructuring, constituting one possible blame avoidance strategy. Departing from the observation that Norway, Denmark, Germany and the UK, countries representing different political systems with different traditions on the use of commissions in the development of public policy, all have appointed commissions prior to pension reforms, this paper asks whether a government can avoid electoral setbacks when they scale back popular welfare arrangements. All four countries share the challenge of ageing societies. The commissions, however, have different mandates and are composed differently with respect to the number of members and their background as politicians, experts or interest group representatives. The paper argues that gaining acceptance for reforms is not just a matter of dealing with vested interests in the form of labour unions and employers´ organizations and creating consensus among political parties but just as much about convincing the general public of the need for reform. The choice of commission strategy, i.e. how the commission is composed and what mandate it is given, will thus vary with the political systems and the barriers set by these. By tailoring mandate and composition the governments are able to shape public opinion and reduce their vulnerability to electoral punishments. Studying the use of commissions in such different contexts responds to calls in literature on social policy for studies on when governments risk unpopular welfare reforms as well as when they succeed. Methodologically, the cross-country qualitative comparison of commission reports is supplemented by interviews with national experts and policy makers.
